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Abstract: The core focus of this paper is to assess the relationship between the electricity 
consumption and institutions within rentierism phenomenon by incorporating economic 
growth, urbanization, trade openness and foreign direct investment in the case of Algeria. To 
this end, we have applied the ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration and innovative 
accounting approach (variance decomposition and impulse response methods) over the period 
of 1971-2012. Our empirical results show that these variables are cointegrated in the long-run. 
We find that institutions play an important role to explain this cointegration. The response of 
electricity demand is increasingly negative due to the one standard deviation shock in 
institutions. This highlights an insightful evidence, providing that the poor governance 
drawbacks in a rentier state may affect directly electricity consumption or indirectly via 
urbanization and foreign direct investment. The contribution of economic growth to electricity 
consumption appears minor (the conservation hypothesis is limitedly supported), while that of 
trade openness seems insignificant.  
Keywords: Electricity consumption, institutions, rentier state. 
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1. Introduction  
Electricity is an important factor of production for both developed and developing 
countries. Controlling this factor seems a great challenge not only for businesses but also for 
policy makers. The first ones focused on controlling the production costs. The second ones 
aim to improve the rate of economic growth and to use cleaner energy forms to enhance 
environmental protection. This is why the relationship between energy consumption -in 
general and electricity consumption particularly- and economic growth has received 
appreciable attention in the existing energy economics literature, either theoretically or 
empirically.  
Given the importance of this issue in formulating the energy policies, the causal 
relationship between energy consumption and economic growth has been and continues to be 
one of the main subjects of intense empirical economics‘ research. The purpose of assessing 
the causal link between these two variables is to make policy recommendation for 
government. For example, if there is an unidirectional causal relationship running from 
economic growth to energy consumption, this means that a conservative energy policy plays 
an important role to enhance economic development (the conservation hypothesis). In 
addition, if the energy consumption is a crucial component in economic growth (the growth 
hypothesis), this implies that while energy is a limiting factor to economic growth, a policy to 
increase investment in industrial sectors, particularly electrification is likely to stimulate 
economic development. We can also identify the bidirectional causality (the feedback 
hypothesis), emphasizing an interdependent relationship between electricity consumption and 
economic growth. Moreover, energy can have no impact on economic growth and vice versa 
(the neutrality hypothesis), suggesting that neither conservative nor expansive energy policies 
have any effect on economic growth. The results of these studies are mixed and inconclusive. 
They depend to the different country coverage, econometric methodologies and data 
disponibility (see for example, Apergis and Payne (2009) and Ozturk (2010)). Bouoiyour et 
al. (2014) add that energy policies cannot be designed without considering economic and 
political factors, which are unfortunately excluded in the majority of researches.  
Our study differs from the previous works on the same field. It not only re-assesses the 
above assumptions, but it attempts to give novel insights and some new explanations to 
elucidate understanding on the concerned relationship. Among these elements of explanation, 
this research considers institutions as the focal factor that explains the cointegration between 
electricity consumption and economic growth by incorporating other explanatory variables 
that may have effect on electricity consumption. Normally, the results should help policy 
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makers in implementing future electricity policies for sustainable economic growth in long-
run.  
This study has focused on the Algerian case for six main reasons: Firstly, few studies 
have investigated how interact institutions with energy consumption-economic growth nexus 
on the case of Algeria. Alvarez (2010) and Fuinhas and Marques (2013), for example, have 
well invoked the institutions to explain the fact that energy consumption negatively impacts 
economic growth, but this has not been demonstrated. This improves the need to an accurate 
investigation on the field. Secondly, the electricity sector concerns a major part of the 
population but it receives a low priority and a limited attention at policy level. This sector is 
not regulated, not organized between producers and consumers and stills an informal sector 
(Mebtoul, 2013). Thirdly, Algeria is a large consumer of electricity compared to its Maghreb 
neighbours. The electricity is largely produced from gas in Algeria, which covers 96% of 
electricity demand in the country in 2013. A 3% comes from diesel, especially for the isolated 
areas (the South), and 1% from water. This country has experienced an electrification rate of 
41% in 1970 to nearly 99% in 2013, classed as one of the most important rates in the world. 
Fouthly, residential consumption accounts for 60% of total electricity consumption, while 
consumption in the industrial sector is about 10%. For comparison, these percentages are 
respectively 30% and 45% in Europe. This highlights the gap that separates Algeria from its 
European neighbors. Then, an assessment of the relationship between electricity consumption 
and its determinants, with a predominant source of rent (hydrocarbons), refers to the issue of 
energy transition that the Algerian government tries to implement. This energy transition can 
be hardly achieved given the inherent constraints closely related to the question of the 
energy‘s usage in Algeria. This question is itself highly linked to the wider issue of 
governance in this country, especially in light of the Arab revolutions across the North Africa 
and Middle East region. Finally, Algeria is characterized by the existence of a powerful state 
and a well-established structure that has preserved its expansive prerogatives and has 
enhanced its power. Under these conditions, innovative or creative individual initiatives are, 
de facto, limited. The rentier economy allows the state to have sufficient resources to 
subsidize of most consumer products, which inhibit the emergence of an industrial spirit. The 
main aim of the paper is to explain why Algeria failed to join the club of higher performers. 
The quality of institutions may properly constitute a substantial element of explanation. We 
address this issue by interplaying institutions with the relationship between electricity 
consumption and its determinants.  
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The remainder of the article is laid out as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review 
previous empirical research into the relationship between electricity consumption, institutions 
and economic growth. Section 3 presents an overview on the link between electricity demand 
and institutions in a rentier state. Section 4 presents the followed methodology. Section 5 
describes and discusses the results, while the last section concludes and offers some economic 
implications. 
 
2. Brief literature survey 
The sizeable growing energy consumption, the steady increase in energy prices and the 
continuous reconfiguration of energy markets present an array of problems often highlighted 
by policy makers. This, in turn, make economists increasingly pay attention to energy 
consumption as an important determinant of economic growth (see, for example, Kraft and 
Kraft (1978), Soytas and Sari (2003), Lee (2006), Tang (2008), Ghosh (2009), Al-Mulati 
(2011), Niu et al. (2011), Dobnick (2011), Sadrosky (2012), Shahbaz et al. (2012), Shahbaz et 
al. (2013), Bouoiyour and Selmi (2013), Bouoiyour et al. (2014), Sbia et al. (2014)). Despite 
this huge amount of empirical research on this field, neither the theoretical nor the empirical 
literature finds one-sided evidence with respect to the nature of this relationship (short-run, 
long-run or joint links) or to the direction of causation. Due to different studied countries, 
econometric methodologies, time periods and variables, there is no cut-clear consensus for 
this focal relationship. 
The different results frequently obtained by previous studies may be synthesized into 
four testable hypotheses
1
. First, the conservation hypothesis is based on a unidirectional 
causal relationship running from economic growth to energy consumption (Lee and Chang 
(2005), Tang (2008), Arouri et al. (2012)). Second, the growth hypothesis suggests that 
energy consumption is a crucial component in economic growth. This means that while 
energy is a limiting factor to economic growth, a policy to increase investment in industrial 
sectors, particularly electrification is likely to stimulate economic activity and hence 
economic growth (Wolde-Rufael (2005), Al-Ariani (2006), Zamani (2007) and Gosh (2009)). 
Third, the feedback hypothesis or the bidirectional causality emphasizes an interdependent 
relationship between electricity consumption and economic growth (Masih and Masih (1996) 
and Ghali and El-Sakka (2004)). Fourth, the neutrality hypothesis means that energy 
                                                             
1
 The denotations of neutrality hypothesis and the bidirectional link or the feedback hypothesis have been widely 
used by the previous studies on the energy consumption-economic growth nexus. However, the denotations of 
the other directions of causality (i.e. growth hypothesis and conservation hypothesis) were proposed by Apergis 
and Payne (2009). 
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consumption is not correlated with economic growth and suggests that neither conservative 
nor expansive energy policies have any effect on economic growth (Soytas end Saris (2003) 
and Chiou-Wei et al. (2008)). 
All the above researches have neglected the role that plays governance in explaining 
the relationship between electricity consumption and economic growth in rentier state. 
Surprisingly, Middle East specialists have long invoked poor governance (weakness of 
institutions), rentier economic development, severe social disparities and repression that 
characterize the region (Schwarz (2008), Foley (2010), Gray (2010) and Elbadawi and 
Makdisi (2011)). Despite these interesting conclusions that may have important economic 
implications, a limited strand of literature has focused on the interplay between electricty 
consumption, economic growth and institutions. For instance, Auty (2001), Gylfason (2001), 
Damania and Bulte (2003), Aslaksen and Torvi (2005) and Farooq et al. (2013) argue that 
corruption could be blamed for the failure of a number of energy-rich economies to develop.  
In the economies with rentierism characteristics, the relationship between electricity 
consumption and economic growth may be more complicated, i.e. given to poor governance 
in MENA countries, energy subsidies are infamously inefficient, which makes the dynamic 
interaction between electricity consumption and economic growth more complex that has 
been sometimes claimed (Stevens and Dietshe (2008) and Fuinhas and Marques (2013)). Due 
to the apparent lack of literature considering the link between electricity consumption, 
governance and economic growth in rentier states, we intend to fill this gap by providing new 
evidence on whether institutions matter or not for the  focal nexus, with special reference to 
rentier countries highly exposed to external price shocks (Algeria).  
 
3. Rentierism : Algerian context  
Despite the widespread use of the concept of rentierism within the literature on the 
energy MENA countries (Anderson (1987), Talahite (2005), Jenkins et al. (2011)), rentierism 
stills a concept lacking an accurate  definition. In general, a rentier state is a government that 
is able to extract significant rents from international transactions and thereby become the 
dominant actor in the political economy (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987). When the government 
has substantial income, it may reduce the tax burden and domestic expenditures. This 
weakens institutions
2
 (Smith (2004 a), Herb (2005) and Aslaksen (2011)). In rentier 
                                                             
2 Institutions are the formal and informal constraints on political, economic and social interactions (North, 1990). 
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economies, people have a little influence over political class and the state is free from the 
need to extract income from taxes on the domestic economy. Since resource rents highlight 
the need to levy taxes against the citizenry, the state is able to act independent of the will of 
the people (Auty (1998), Fearon (2005), Ross (2006), Aslaksen and Torvik (2005), de Soysa 
and Neumayer (2007), de Soysa (2007) and Lotz (2008)). This may expose electricity sector 
(in particular electric projects) to strong barriers due to the ineffectiveness of institutions and 
to inflexible electricity market structures prevailing in rentier states (Alvarez (2010) and 
Fuinhas and Marques (2013)). With property rights highly disseminated through society 
(Stevens and Dietshe, 2008) and with an energy market unliberalized, non-competitive and 
dominated by cumbersome state monopolies (Synder and Bhavanani (2005), Synder (2006) 
and Jenkins et al. 2011), rentier state often encounter difficulties when seeking energy 
projects.  
Algeria is a typical example of rentier economy because most of the economic activity 
(90% of the national wealth and 96% of exports) is mainly linked to single sector, 
hydrocarbons. This creates several outcomes (Alvarez, 2010). First, the country seems highly 
dependent to ups and downs energy‘s movements, yielding to an exogenous economic 
development. The fluctuations of international markets generate excessive volatility. This 
prevents a long-run development-building strategy. Second, this great dependence and 
sizeable instability prevent the government and the administration to make credible forecasts 
of budget and economic growth in the short-and-medium terms. Finally, this dependence is 
harmful not only for an economy as a whole, but also at the societal perception of the values 
of work, efforts and self-sacrifice in order to achieve results. This may be the most disastrous 
consequence. It seems perverse of rentier economy. This obviously explains the wide 
diffusion of rentier mentality within society. Therefore, to take risk no longer offer guarantees 
to get rich. It is the clientelism rather than the predation that allow some close circles to get 
rich fastly. The reward is related to a fluke and not to a well organized production process, 
generating therefore a ‗‗circulation economy‘‘ instead of a ‗‗production economy‘‘ (Chatelus, 
1982). In good governance countries, the institutions promote the private initiatives. More 
precisely, entrepreneurs choose to invest in productive activities rather than rentier, non-
developmental and non-productive resource sectors.  
In Algeria, there exist several paradoxes. Residential electricity consumption 
represents 60% of total electricity consumption of the country. For comparison, this 
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percentage amounts twice of that found in Europe
3
. It should be noted that both wealthier and 
poor households pay the same price of electricity. This is also valid for other subsidized 
products (bread, fuel). In the same vein, industrial consumption is very low (10% against 45% 
in Europe). In other words, households consume more electricity than businesses. This 
paradox is related to generalized subsidies and non-target electricity prices. Obviously, these 
subsidies are very expensive and ineffective. They pushe households electricity use upwards. 
It is recalled that the subsidies for energy products reached $ 10.59 billion in 2010, where 
electricity consumption subsidies amounted to $ 2.13 billion, while 8.46 billion dollars were 
directed to fuels. This represents 6.6% of the national wealth or 298 dollars per capita. 
Accurately, it should be added that these rates vary between 2 Algerian dinar (DA) and 3.20 
DA/ kwh depending on the level of electricty consumption, against respectively 3.45 DA and 
4.94 DA / kwh in Tunisia and 5.27 DA and 6.40 DA / kwh in Morocco. Given the 
impossibility to remove or at least reduce the subsidies, some national reports (Mebtoul, 
2013) highlight the risk of going to 70 billion of gas cubic meters of domestic consumption on 
the horizon 2017-2020, surpassing the volume of exports in 2012 and making problematic the 
extrapolation of 85 billion gas cubic meters expected in 2014. It is true that the current context 
and the events that knows the MENA region (the aftermath of revolution) do not allow 
subsidies‘ limitations that may have detrimental effect on social peace. But the system slows 
down. Some researchers (Mebtoul, 2013) predict the depletion of oil reserves in 2020 and 
conventional gas reserves in 2030, taking into account the strong domestic consumption, the 
cost-of-living and the increased competition facing the new world energy markets. 
 
4.  Methodology 
4.1. Data 
The study uses annual data of real GDP (Y), electricity consumption (EC), 
urbanization (URB) in percentage of population, foreign direct investment (FDI) and the 
global index of political rights as governance indicator or institutional quality‘s proxy(INS). 
Theoretically, the poor governance has various detrimental effects on energy sector policies, 
particularly electricity sector. Accordingly, Smith (2004 b) argues that the electricity theft and 
weaker institutions are closely linked and adds that higher power fraud is intensely associated 
to corrupt practices within power sector organizations. Rencently, Fouinhas and Marques 
(2013) show that the corruption is one of the most difficult problem for electricity sector. 
                                                             
3 The comparison with Europe is given for illustrative purposes. We are well aware that Algeria and Europe are 
totally different at all levels. 
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Nevertheless, some studies show that trade opennes reduces the detrimental effects of poor 
governance, suggesting therefore that countries which do not favor institutional improvements 
can establish a policy of open market (Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Blake and Christopher 
(2002)). Given this evidence, we include trade opennes (TR) in the same models to verify this 
evidence. 
Obviously, the governance consists of the institutions by which authority in a state is 
exercised.  This includes the capacity of the government to implement effective policies. To 
test claims about the impact og institutions on electricity demand, adequate measurements of 
institutional quality are needed. While some data are available, they are problematic because 
they are not an accurate effective governance proxy. Data come from expert assessments and 
surveys of government officials. The coverage of most sources of data is limited and do not 
share a common methodology, set of questions or measurement scale of responses. Freedom 
House (United States) tried to address these problems by developing aggregate governance 
indicators that draw from many available sources. The global index of political rights is a 
quantitative assessment tool that presents a comprehensive set of indicators on the possible 
situations in which the political rights may have a direct impact on  the lives of ordinary 
people. This indicator combines various dimensions of political rights including fundamental 
rights, open government, effective regulatory enforcement, access to civil justice, among 
others. The lowest score (1 and 2) in the scale of political rights are awarded to countries that 
respect the holding of fair elections, the presence of opposition parties and the rights of 
minority groups. The highest scores (6 and 7) are granted to states where political rights are 
absent, either because of an oppressive regime or a situation of political instability. 
All the data are collected from perspective Usherbrooke
4
, covering the period of 1971-
2012. During this period, Algeria had a population explosion. To deal with this fact, Y and EC 
were converted into values per capita (in thousands of person). To improve the precision 
power of results, we carry out a log-linear specification that incorporates Y, URB, TR and FDI 
(Model 1). Then, we add the INS  used as an indicator of governance (Model 2). 
tttttt LFDIaLTRaLURBaLYaaLEC  43210                                                          (1) 
tttttt INSbLFDIbLTRbLURBbLYbbLEC  543210                                              
(2) 
Where   and  are the error terms with normal distribution, zero mean and finite variance. 
Economic growth affets electricty consumption via income and technique effects. If income 
                                                             
4 http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/statistiques/9 
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effect dominates technique effect, 01 a  otherwise 01 a . An incraese in urbanization leads 
industrialization, raises the demand for housing, public utilities etc which affects electricty 
demand (Shahbaz and Lean, 2012). We expect 02 a . Trade openness affects electricty 
consumption via income effect, technique and composite effect (Sadorsky, 2011, 2012). So, it 
is expected that 03 a . Foreign direct direct investmnet stimulated eocnomic activity which 
impacts electricty demand positively. We expect that 04 a . Similarly for equation 2, we 
expect 01 b  (if income effect dominates technique effect), 02 b , 03 b , 04 b .  However, 
the sign of b5 seems ambiguous. More precisely, good institutions can improve electricity 
consumption in the sense that they allow optimal management of resources. But we cannot 
say at this stage that electricity should increase or decrease. This depends on the degree of 
development of the country in question.  
 
4.2. The ARDL Bounds Testing Method 
The ARDL bounds testing approach has been introduced by Pesaran and Shin (1999) 
and extended by Pesaran et al. (2001). It deals with single cointegration. This method allows 
us to see whether there is long-run relationship beteween a group of time-series, some of 
which may be stationary at level, while others are not.  The ARDL bounds testing approach 
has three main advantages compared to other cointegration approaches: Firstly, the time series 
are assumed to be endogenous. Secondly, it obviates the need to classify the time series into 
I(0) or I(1) as Johansen cointegration. Thirdly, it allows us to assess simultanuously the short-
run and the long-run coefficients associated to the variables under consideration. This paper 
applies this method to investigate the relationship between electricity consumption, economic 
growth, urbanization, trade openness, foreign direct investment (with institutions versus 
without institutions). The ARDL representations of equations (1) and (2) or the equations of 
unrestricted error correction models (UECM) are formulated respectively as follows : 
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Where D  denotes the first difference operator;   and   are the usual white noise residuals.  
To evaluate whether there is a cointegration or not depends upon the critical bounds 
tabulated by Pesaran et al. (2001, p.300). There is a cointegration among variables if 
calculated F-statistic is more than upper critical bound. If the lower bound is superior to the 
computed F-statistic, we accept the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Moreover, if the        
F-statistic seems between lower and upper critical bounds, the cointegration is inconclusive. 
The stability of ARDL approach to cointegration is assessed by carrying out various 
diagnostic tests and stability analyses. The diagnostic tests include the adjustment R-squared, 
the standard error regression, Breush-Godfrey-serial correlation and Ramsey Reset test. The 
stability of short-run and long-run estimates is checked by applying the cumulative sum of 
recursive residuals and the cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals. 
 
4.3. The innovative acounting approach  
The previous studies on the relationship between electricity consumption and 
economic grwth have widely investigated whether there is a causal link between both 
variables. To this end, the majority of them use the standard Granger causality test augmented 
with a lagged error correction term. Based on Engle and Granger (1987)‘s method, the 
Granger causality test through vector autoregression method may be inadequate. To overcome 
this gap, an inclusion of an additional variable to the vector autoregression may be effective 
and would allow us to detect the long-run relationship between variables under consideration. 
However, the Granger causality drawbacks still. It is unable to capture the possible effects of 
shocks and to indicate how much extent of causality exists from one variable to other 
(Shahbaz et al. 2013). To resolve these limitations, we explore an innovative accounting 
approach to assess the dynamic interaction among electricity consumption, economic growth, 
urbanization, trade openness, foreign direct investments and institutions. This method 
includes forecast error variance decomposition and impulse response function. The procedure 
decomposes forecast error variance for each series following a one standard deviation shock 
to a variable, and allows us to test the strength of its impact on the series. 
 
5. Results  
5.1.ARDL results 
To investigate if there is a significant long-run relationship that runs from electricity 
consumption to economic growth or vice versa, we began by evaluating the validity of 
estimated coefficients. We worthy notice from Table-1 a great variability of data, which 
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highlights the need to use robust models to handle possible shocks. The coefficient of kurtosis 
appears inferior to 3 for all variables under consideration (except Y and TR), implying that the 
distribution is less flattened than the Gaussian distribution. The Skewness coefficient is 
negative for Y, EC and FDI, while it seems negative for URB and TR. This indicates that the 
symmetrical distribution is plausible for the first ones and inversely for the second ones. The 
Jarque- Bera test revealed low and insignificant values (except Y and INS), leading to accept 
the assumption of normality for all variables except Y. 
 
Table 1. Summary of statistics 
  LEC LY LURB LTR LFDI LINS 
 Mean 6.197305 9.050105 3.974662 11.12861 18.35663  5.974359 
 Median 6.309388 9.053522 3.975133 11.08701 19.04662  6.000000 
 Maximum 6.943259 9.257345 4.306198 14.16968 21.83939  7.000000 
 Minimum 4.945555 8.646407 3.680494 9.303406 12.72163  4.000000 
 Std. Dev. 0.552327 0.122415 0.198924 1.014125 2.768434  0.584321 
Skewness -0.741402 -0.631308  0.047553  0.580637 -0.646494 -1.603734 
 Kurtosis  2.695106  4.223384  1.746310  3.677718  2.354147  8.275203 
 Jarque-Bera  4.010415  5.409016  2.766373  3.163754  3.394532  61.93788 
 Probability  0.134632  0.066903  0.250778  0.205589  0.183184  0.000000 
 Source: Usherbrooke perspectives dataset. 
 
 From the first correlations reported in Table-2, we show that there is a positive 
interaction between urbanization and electricity consumption, economic growth and 
electricity consumption, trade openness and electricity demand and foreign direct investment 
and electricity consumption, while the correlation between the used governance index (the 
global index of political rights) and Algerian electricity demand seems negative. As the 
lowest scores are associated to the respect of political rights including the holding of fair and 
free elections and the highest scores are greatly linked to the absence of political rights, the 
negative correlation means that the poor governance (the high scores of governance proxy 
between 6 and 7) is closely related to the electricity demand in Algeria. 
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Table 2. First correlations between electricity consumption and its determinants 
 LEC LY LURB LTR LFDI LINS 
LEC 1      
LY 0.7406542 1     
LURB 0.9510890 0.64406628 1    
LTR 0.275828 0.27525291 0.41326495 1   
LFDI 0.3517625 0.1722970 0.5509528 0.49325713 1  
LINS -0.0819792 -0.0906488 -0.0167425 0.04329295 0.3161668 1 
Source: Usherbrooke perspectives dataset. 
 
Before proceeding ARDL estimation, we determine the degree of integration of 
variables. To do so, we apply Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. The results 
are reported in Table-3. We clearly show that the variables are integrated either at level or 
first difference (I(0) and I(1)). Given this finding, the ARDL bounds testing approach can be 
employed to test the cointegration hypothesis among concerned variables. 
 
Table  3. Results of ADF and PP Unit Tests 
Variables ADF test PP test 
 Level First difference Level First difference 
LEC   -4.1086 (1) *** --- -3.7297 (4) *** --- 
LY    -0.5487 (1) -8.4468 (0) *** -3.1257 (4) ** --- 
LURB    -0.2377 (6) -3.0834 (0) ***     1.3492 (4) -3.46787 (12) ** 
LTR    -2.4402 (0) -8.4485 (0) ***   -2.5021 (3) -8.4596 (1) *** 
LFDI    -0.9446 (1) -9.6209 (0) ***   -2.2221 (1) -10.0241(4) *** 
LINS    -4.3724 (0) ---   -4.16637 (0) --- 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively ; The numbers within parentheses for 
the ADF  and PP statistics represents the lag length of the dependent variable used to obtain white noise residuals ; The lag 
lengths for the ADF and PP tests were selected using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
 
According to the ARDL bounds testing approach, lag order of the variables is 
important for the model specification. Hence, we determine the lag optimazation based on 
lag-order selection using various information criteria including Akaike criterion, Bayesian and 
Hannan-Quinn criteria (Table-4). It is widely pointed that AIC has superior power properties 
for small sample data compared to any lag length criterion. Akaike information criterion is 
more parcimonious than other criteria since it provides more consistent results (Lütkepohl, 
2006). We find that the optimum lag is 1 over the period of 1975-2011 either for model 1 
(without institutions) or model 2 (with institutions). 
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Table 4. Lag-order selection 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
(1) 
0  60.12773 NA   0.002931 -3.007514 -2.603477 -2.869726 
1  67.85856   10.91411*   0.001982* -3.403445  -2.954515*  -3.250347* 
2  68.90888  1.421012  0.001989  -3.406405* -2.912582 -3.237997 
3  69.63692  0.942176  0.002036 -3.390407 -2.851692 -3.206690 
(2) 
0  96.36237 NA*  0.000371 -5.080139 -4.631210 -4.927041 
1  98.55212  2.962601   0.000348*  -5.150125*  -4.656302*  -4.981717* 
2  98.71004  0.204367  0.000368 -5.100590 -4.561875 -4.916873 
3  98.75296  0.053024  0.000393 -5.044292 -4.460683 -4.845265 
Notes : * indicates lag order selected by the criterion; (1) : Equation of electricity consumption without taking into account 
the institutions ; (2) : Equation of electricity consumption considering institutions ; LR: sequential modified LR test statistic 
(each test at 5% level) ; FPE: Final prediction error ; AIC: Akaike information criterion ; SC: Schwarz information criterion ; 
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion. 
 
Next, we present our empirical results based on ARDL bounds testing (Table-5). We 
show that economic growth has an insignificant impact on electricity consumption (equations 
1 and 2, Table-5). Urbanization contributes positively and significantly to electricity 
consumption when including institutions-particularly the global index of political laws- 
(equation 2, Table-5). Accurately, an increase of urbanization by 10% leads to an increase in 
electricity consumption by 39.3%. The trade openness has  no influence on electricity demand 
in Algeria, while foreign direct investments and institutions affect negatively and significantly 
elecrticity consumption. More precisely, an increase by 10% in foreign direct investment and 
institutions leads to a drop in electricity demand by 0.011% and 0.14% respectively (equation 
2, Table-5). Using different diagnostic tests such as serial correlation and Ramsey Reset tests, 
the adequacy of these models are checked.  
In addition, we depict from Table-6 that the values of our F-statistics exceed the upper 
bound at the 1% significance level for the model that incorporates economic growth, 
urbanization, trade openness and foreign direct investment (equation 1), implying that there is 
evidence of a long-run relationship among variables at this level of significance or greater, 
while the F-statistic value appears insignificant when accounting for instruments (equation 2).  
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Table 5. The ARDL Bounds Testing Analysis 
Dependent variable: ΔLECt 
 (1) (2) 
C 0.09502 
(0.05866) 
1.16495 
(0.55548) 
ΔLECt-1 -0.4789** 
(-2.4191) 
-0.71152** 
(-2.5246) 
ΔLYt-1 0.01130 
(0.0383) 
0.17131 
(0.5166) 
ΔLURBt-1 5.25362 
(1.13826) 
3.93008* 
(1.7989) 
ΔLTRt-1 0.0020 
(0.1721) 
-0.0032 
(-0.2347) 
ΔLFDIt-1 -0.00081* 
(-1.5133) 
-0.00116* 
(-1.8986) 
ΔLINSt-1 --- -0.01473* 
(-1.9370) 
LECt-1 -0.17458 
(-1.0116) 
-0.09217 
(-0.45850) 
LYt-1 0.29833 
(0.2107) 
-0.0529 
(-0.2887) 
LURBt-1 0.14403 
(0.3273) 
-0.08324 
(-0.1582) 
LTRt-1 -0.0052 
(-0.4136) 
-0.0005 
(-0.0331) 
LFDIt-1 -0.0081* 
(-1.5133) 
0.01306* 
(1.8320) 
LINSt-1 --- 0.00173 
(0.09790) 
Diagnostic tests 
ARS 
SER 
LM 
Reset 
0.5604 
0.0451 
1.2717 [0.2993] 
6.8933* [0.0148] 
0.5796 
0.0469 
1.3787 [0.2760] 
0.2841 [0.5999] 
Notes : ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively ; (1) : Equation of electricity 
consumption without taking into account the institutions ; (2) : Equation of electricity consumption considering institutions ; 
[.] : p-values ; ARS denotes the adjustment R-squared. SER means the standard error regression ; LM means the Breush-
Godfrey serial correlation ; Reset denotes Ramsey Reset test; Diagnostic tests results are based on F-statistic. 
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Table 6. The ARDL Bounds Testing Analysis 
 Estimated model Optimal lag length F-statistic Prob. 
(1) FEC (EC/Y, URB, TR, FDI) 1, 1, 6, 0, 1 10.1657*** 0.0007 
(2) FEC (EC/Y, URB, TR, FDI, INS) 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 2 0.0037 0.9509 
Significance level Critical values: T=23 
Lower bounds I(0) Upper bounds I(1) 
1% 
5% 
10% 
6.84 
4.94 
4.04 
7.84 
5.73 
4.78 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively ; (1) : Equation of electricity 
consumption without taking into account the institutions ; (2) : Equation of electricity consumption considering institutions ; 
Critical values were obtained from Pesaran et al. (2001).  
 
 These results seem vulnerable because ARDL bounds test is unable to detect 
structural breaks stemming in the variables. It neglects possible nonlinearities in the focal 
relationship. Due to the apparent drawback, we carried out Gregory-Hansen (1996)‘s method 
to investigate this link. This technique accommodates on an unknown structural break in the 
studied series based on Engle-Granger residual (Farooq et al. 2013). The main findings of this 
test put in evidence that there is cointegration when taking into account institutions (equation 
2, Table-7), while there is no evidence of cointegration between variables for equation 1. 
  
Table 7. Gregory-Hansen Structural Break Cointegration Test 
Estimated model (1) (2) 
 FEC (EC/Y, URB, TR, FDI) FEC (EC/Y, URB, TR, FDI, INS) 
Structural break year 1997 2002 
ADF-test -4.6972*** -4.2680 
Prob.values                0.0000 0.2135 
Significance level Critical values of the ADF test 
1% 
5% 
10% 
-5.71 
-4.86 
-4.59 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively ; (1) : Equation of electricity consumption 
without taking into account the institutions ; (2) : Equation of electricity consumption considering institutions. 
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In the short run, economic growth positively and significantly impacts electricity 
consumption at 10 percent level (Table-8), while this correlation becomes insignificant when 
including institutions (equation 2). Urbanization increases electricity consumption at 10 
percent level either with or without institutions. The effects of trade openness and foreign 
direct investment on electricity demand are statistically insignificant (equations 1 and 2). 
Seemingly, the relationship between institutions and electricity consumption is negative and 
significant. The electricity demand increases because intuitions are inadequate. The price of 
electricity, like that of many necessity products, are fixed too low. This allows to buy lack of 
the social peace, highlighting then the lack of political courage. The political power seems 
ineffective since it is not the result of free elections and therefore can not impose prices more 
or less free, or at least not far from the prices of world market. This country is unable to 
properly administer social programs (Talahite, 2005). More precisely, the inefficient subsidy 
policy aggravates the lack of transparency in the conduct of public policy. This leads 
necessarely to the inability of government to reallocate resources to benefit the broader 
population that may have harmful effects on energy sector and thus on the whole economy.  
Furthermore, the value of ECT is negative and statistically significant at 5 percent 
level for the two estimated equations, which  is theoretically correct. This implies that the 
deviations in the short-run are corrected by 29% towards the long-run equilibvrium (without 
institutions) and becomes less important (27%) when considering institutions. This indicates 
that institutions mitigate the speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium path in the 
case of Algeria. The R-adjusted value shows that the electricity consumption is 14.28% 
explained by economic growth, urbanization, trade openness and foreign direct investment. 
This value increases when adding institutions (Equation 2, Table-8), it becomes 19.22%. This 
highlights the role of institutions to explain electricity demand in Algeria.  
The diagnostic tests indicate that there is no evidence of serial correlation. The 
Ramsey reset test statistic confirms the well construction of the short-run model. The results 
obtained from the CUSUM and CUSUM squares tests show that either considering 
institutions or not, the graphs are between the critical bounds at 5% level of significance 
(Figure-1), which reinforces the adequacy of the ARDL bounds testing approach, the stability 
and the efficience of the ARDL parameters. 
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Table 8. Short-run and long-run Analysis 
Dependent variable: LECt 
 (1) (2) 
Short-run 
ΔLYt 0.30789* 
(1.62314) 
0.23981 
(0.87842) 
ΔLURBt 3.89112* 
(1.60067) 
4.3839* 
(1.6441) 
ΔLTRt -0.00338 
(-0.3654) 
-0.00264 
(-0.23824) 
ΔLFDIt -0.00338 
(-0.3654) 
0.00021 
(0.04508) 
ΔLINSt --- -0.01725* 
(-1.7475) 
ECTt -0.29243** 
(-2.89173) 
-0.27116** 
(-2.1116) 
Long-run 
LYt -0.06900 
(-0.63282) 
-0.08535 
(-0.57567) 
LURBt -0.37063 
(-1.06747) 
-0.55472 
(-1.25424) 
LTRt -0.00035 
(-0.03624) 
0.00258 
(0.21176) 
LFDIt 0.00047 
50.07688) 
0.00426 
(0.66751) 
LINSt --- 0.00955 
(0.66957) 
Diagnostic tests 
ARS 
SER 
LM 
 
Reset 
 
0.1428 
0.0371 
1.0357 
[0.4621] 
2.3594 
[0.0112] 
0.1922 
0.0343 
1.6942 
[0.1339] 
0.9606 
[0.0081] 
Notes : ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively ; (1) : Equation of electricity 
consumption without taking into account the institutions ; (2) : Equation of electricity consumption considering institutions; 
[.] : p-values ; ARS denotes the adjustment R-squared. SER means the standard error regression ; LM means the Breush-
Godfrey serial correlation. Reset denotes Ramsey Reset test; Diagnostic tests results are based on F-statistic. 
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       Figure 1. Plots of cumulative sum of recursive and of squares of recursive residuals 
(1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes : (1) : Equation of electricity consumption without taking into account the institutions ; (2) : Equation of electricity 
consumption considering institutions ; The straight lines represent the critical bounds at 5% significance level. 
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5.2.Variance decomposition results  
The variance decomposition approach findings of electricity consumption are reported 
in Table-9. The results of Equation 1 (without institutions) show that 50.92 percent of 
electricity demand is explained by its own innovative shocks and 10.97 percent of electricity 
consumption is explained by economic growth. The contribution of urbanization in explaining 
electricity demand is only 6.73, while that of trade openness seems minor, i.e. 4.55%. The 
support of foreign direct investments amounts 26.83%.  The results change substantively 
when considering institutions (Equation 2, Table-9). 10.49% of electricity demand is 
explained by institutions. We clearly observe that the contribution of economic growth, 
foreign direct investments in explaining electricity consumption as well as its own innovative 
shocks become less important, which amount respectively, 6.36%, 15.93% and 33.28%. 
However, the contributions of urbanization and trade openness become more strong, (23.19% 
and 10.76% respectively). This confirms the evidence, providing that institutional quality 
plays an important role in explaining electricity consumption in the rentier states (Jenkins et 
al. 2011). Unfortunately, in MENA rentier economies in general and Algeria in particular 
(Fuinhas and Marques, 2013), public institutions responsible for the energy sector 
management are weak and ineffective. Hence, it will substantially important to strengthen the 
human capacity to effectively administer the electricity sector (Jenkins et al. 2011). It appears 
also necessary to improve energy governance including the development of appropriate 
systems of energy pricing, the implementation of effective subsidy policy that allows a 
gradual reduction of energy subsidies, the publication of electricity contracts and information 
on active shareholders and the conflicts of interest between official state and politicians who 
occupy responsibility positions in electricity companies in order to enhance the transparency 
of electricity sector.  
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Table 9. Variance Decomposition of Electricity Consumption 
 Period S.E. LEC LY LURB LTR LFDI LINS 
(1) 
1  0.037466  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 --- 
2  0.038269  95.85230  3.610005  0.005937  0.375789  0.155973 --- 
3  0.045122  79.03017  2.816987  12.69830  0.839084  4.615465 --- 
4  0.057562  70.57462  3.951738  8.714615  5.172940  11.58609 --- 
5  0.061551  66.19041  6.008333  8.137104  5.056548  14.60761 --- 
6  0.068542  60.65183  7.963584  7.498157  4.456970  19.42946 --- 
7  0.073781  56.96610  9.341106  7.017138  4.763999  21.91166 --- 
8  0.077386  54.41681  10.01879  6.902700  4.791627  23.87008 --- 
9  0.080729  52.39140  10.64713  6.727147  4.656163  25.57816 --- 
10  0.082891  50.92714  10.97532  6.735621  4.553169  26.80875 --- 
(2) 
1  0.031842  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
2  0.035433  81.04281  8.925533  4.213529  1.011339  3.666561  1.140225 
3  0.041108  71.03186  6.658812  10.62393  1.426997  5.615896  4.642510 
4  0.056931  61.26317  3.526467  14.11910  10.52043  4.155385  6.415443 
5  0.065231  46.85499  5.718320  18.70492  8.680000  15.11069  4.931082 
6  0.070761  44.16903  6.393693  21.16796  8.072030  15.99746  4.199824 
7  0.082930  41.16901  6.835441  18.25306  7.938125  15.88966  9.914703 
8  0.087722  38.00078  6.501868  19.13884  7.724652  17.51696  11.11690 
9  0.092172  34.42882  5.892172  23.70122  9.496603  16.40441  10.07677 
10  0.097242  33.23831  6.368909  23.19980  10.76670  15.93377  10.49250 
Notes : (1) : Equation of electricity consumption without taking into account the institutions ; (2) : Equation of 
electricity consumption considering institutions. 
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5.3.Impulse responses results 
The impulse response function is alternative to the variance decomposition method 
showing how long independent variable reacts to shocks stemming in the dependent variables. 
By applying this technique, we can identify the magnitude of the response of electricity 
consumption to its own shocks, those of economic growth, urbanization, trade openness, 
foreign direct investment and to see then whether the behaviours of the dynamic interactions 
between these variables change when including institutions. The results reported in Figure-2 
indicate that the response in electricity consumption owing to forecast error stemming in 
economic growth is initially positive, goes downwards after 2th time horizon and becomes 
negative until 4th time horizon. The contribution of urbanization to electricity demand is 
positive over time and becomes less stable after 10th time horizon. The response of electricity 
consumption seems initially positive and becomes negative after 4th time horizon due to the 
forecast error stemming in trade openness. The response of Algeria‘s electricity demand due 
to foreacast error stemming in foreign direct investment appears negligible at the two first 
time horizons and becomes positive untile the 3rd time horizon (first graph, Figure-2). When 
considering institutions, the behaviours of the relationships under consideration change 
intensely (second graph, Figure-2). The electricity demand  reacts to growth  as it reponds 
positively (slightly) for the first 2 time horizons and then subsides to zero afterwards. The 
contribution of urbanization to electricity consumption seems negligeable until 2th time 
horizon and then becomes a positive contributor factor. Trade openness contributes negatively 
electricity consumption, especially after the firt 3 time horizons. The response of electricity 
demand is positive due to one standard deviation shock in foreign direct investment, while its 
response appears increasingly negative due to one standard deviation shock in instruments. 
Given these observed outcomes, there is a need to improve the governance situation and the 
quality of institutions by strengthening civil and political liberties, government effectiveness, 
the political stability, by reducing burdensome regulations (the implementation of regulatory 
burdens program that has as main objectives to check if there are inopportune rules) and by 
developing various initiatives aimed at establishing the traceability systems for electricity 
sector in favour of technological investments. 
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Figure 3. Impulse Response Function 
(1) 
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 (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) : Equation of electricity consumption without taking into account the institutions ; (2) : Equation of electricity 
consumption considering institutions. 
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6. Conclusion and some economic implications 
The article attempts to assess empirically the relationship between electricity 
consumption and institutions in Algeria by incorporating economic growth, urbanization, 
trade openness and foreign direct investment over the period of 1971-2012. The main aim is 
to check whether institutions play an important role to explain electricity demand whithin 
rienterism framework. To do so, we applied the ARDL bounds testing approach to test 
cointegration and the innovative accounting approach to capture the responses of electricity 
consumption to the shocks stemming in the above variables.  
Our results show that the series in model 1 (without institutions) are cointegrated, 
similarly for those  in model 2 (with institutions) but only when accounting for structural 
breaks using Gregory and Hansen (1996)‘s test. This means that it is crucial to consider 
regime shifts when investigating the linkage between electricity demand and institutions. The 
innovative accounting approach indicates that institutions play an important role in explaining 
electricity consumption. The variance decomposition results reveal that the interaction 
dynamics between series change intensely when considering institutions (i.e. by adding 
institutions (model 2), the contributions of urbanization and trade openness become stronger 
and those of economic growth and foreign direct investment become less important). 
Intuitively, the impulse response method puts in evidence that the response of electricity 
consumption seems increasingly negative due to the one standard deviation shock in 
instituions. This may have interesting economic implications.  
First, the Algerian government must take proactive measures to improve governance. 
The institutional weaknesses in energy sector needs to be overcome. Such expertise will be 
needed for years to come in the public sector for the development and management of energy 
policies and regulations. Additionally, policy makers should provide accurate solutions to 
overcome financial and technical constraints on energy efficiency investments (Marino et al. 
(2011) and Kevin (2013)). Well developed institutions will support and push foreign direct 
investment on progress. For example, the communication and the sensitisation among policy 
makers, investors and consumers can play a prominent role in promoting energy conservation 
in different sectors. 
Second, Algeria should mitigates its dependence on hydrocarbons by adopting 
incentive measures including appropriate systems of energy pricing and the gradual reduction 
of fuel subsidies. This should be granted indiscriminately to all energy consumers, to mitigate 
then a great rise in electricity consumption. Obviously, the over consumption may prompt 
power cuts especially during the high heat periods (summer). This requires courageous 
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political decisions and transparent elections. Therefore, there is a need for legislative 
frameworks that would take into account the way in which authority is organized and 
legitimated (Fjelde, 2009).  
Thirdly, due to the significantly negative effect of institutions on the electricity 
demand and thus to governance drawbacks, it is crucial to implement various commitments to 
ensure better energy sector governance. For example, it seems important to facilitate the right 
of access to information from executive bodies related to power policies, to develop the rights 
to participate in policy-making decisions by implementing timelines for electricity system, 
and to enhance the access to the reports of institutions in order to strengthen the transparency 
of electricity sector governance. 
Finally, because the economic growth and the increased cost-of-living in Algeria 
remain despite the abundance of natural resources, this latter may be beneficial if it is 
accompanied by important internal changes. These positive outcomes cannot be significant 
without an improvement of the management strategy. This highlights the utmost importance 
of human resources development including employee training, employee career development, 
innovative incentives and performance management. 50 years after independence, Algeria 
lacks human capital with creative thinking skills able to create innovative projects and 
establish solid institutions, prerequisite for self-sustaining and durable growth. Far from being 
independent, these elements are mutually reinforcing (Beblawi, 2008). However, the 
development of human resources cannot ignore the necessity of profound institutional 
changes, not only in terms of the different training and educational levels, but also on how the 
country is governed.   
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